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Abstract— Collusion-secure codes are used for digital finger-
printing and for traitor tracing. In both cases, the goal is to
prevent unauthorised copying of copyrighted material, by tracing
at least one guilty user when illegal copies appear. The most well-
known collusion-secure code is due to Boneh and Shaw (1995/98).
In this paper we improve the decoding algorithm by using soft
output from the inner decoder, and we show that this permits
using significantly shorter codewords.
I. INTRODUCTION
Copyright piracy and protection against it is a problem
receiving tremendous interest, both in research communities
and in the daily press. Music and movie industries claim to
be losing money by the billions. Different kinds of technology
have been proposed in order to protect against illegal copying.
Digital fingerprinting is one such method.
Digital fingerprinting was introduced in [7], and given
increasing attention following [2]. A vendor selling digital
copies of copyrighted material wants to prevent illegal copy-
ing. Digital fingerprinting is supposed to make it possible to
trace the guilty user (pirate) when an illegal copy is found.
This is done by embedding a secret identification mark, called
a fingerprint, in each copy, making every copy unique.
The fingerprint must be embedded in such a way that it does
not disturb the information in the data file too much. A human
user should not be able to spot any difference between the
fingerprinted copy and the original. It must also be impossible
for the user to remove or damage the fingerprint, without
damaging the information contents beyond any practical use.
This embedding problem is essentially the same as the problem
of watermarking.
If a single pirate distributes unauthorised copies, they will
carry his fingerprint. If the vendor discovers the illegal copies
he can trace them back to the pirate and prosecute him. If
several pirates collude, they can to some extent tamper with
the fingerprint. When they compare their copies they see some
bits (or symbols) which differ and thus must be part of the
fingerprint. Identified bits may be changed, and thus the pirates
create a hybrid copy with a false fingerprint. A collusion-
secure code is a set of fingerprints which enables the vendor
to trace pirates even when they collude, given that there are
no more than   pirates for some threshold  .
As fingerprinting is a forensic technique, used to trace the
guilty part when a violation is evidenced, it is less contro-
versial than many techniques for digital rights management,
which often restricts legal use and copying of the file as well
as the illegal copying.
Collusion-secure coding is also employed in traitor tracing
[3]. Whereas fingerprinting protects the digital data in them-
selves, traitor tracing protects broadcast encryption keys.
The most well-known collusion secure code is the Boneh-
Shaw (BS) scheme [2]. An overview of other proposals is
found in [5], which also contains a new analysis of the error
probability for the BS scheme, showing that the codewords can
be made much shorter than initially assumed. In this paper, we
make further improvement by using soft output from the inner
decoding. The major novelty of this paper is to find a good
output parameter from the inner decoding.
II. ON COLLUSION-SECURE CODES
The set of fingerprints is an  
 
code, which provides
for up to  buyers, uses an alphabet of  symbols, and
requires  such symbols embedded in the digital file. Let  
or just  be the minimum Hamming distance of the code .
The normalised minimum distance is Æ  . The rate of the
code is    .
Definition 1 (Concatenation) Let 
 
be a  
 
 	
 
and let


be an  



code. Then the concatenated code 
 
Æ

is the  
 



 
code obtained by taking the words of 

and mapping every symbol on a word from 
 
. Each set of

 
symbols corresponding to one word of the inner code will
be called a block.
To understand the fingerprinting problem, we must know
what the pirates are allowed to do. This is defined by the
Marking Assumption.
Definition 2 (The Marking Assumption) Let 
    be the
set of fingerprints held by a coallition of pirates. The pirates
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can produce a copy with a false fingerprint   for any   


 
 , where


 
    
 
     

    
 
     

  
 

 


We call 

 
  the feasible set of 
 with respect to .
The Marking Assumption defines the requirements for the
embedding of the fingerprint in the digital data. Constructing
appropriate embeddings is non-trivial, though it is not the-
oretically impossible [2]. Alternative assumptions have been
proposed, and some overview of this can be found in [1].
A tracing algorithm for the code  is any algorithm 
which takes a vector   as input and outputs a set    . If
  is a false fingerprint produced by some coallition 
   ,
then  is successful if  is a non-empty subset of 
 . We say
that we have an error of Type I if   
   and an error
of Type II if 
 	 . A Type I error means that we do
not find any guilty pirate, wheras Type II means accusing an
innocent user. Let 
 
and 

denote the probabilites of Type
I and Type II errors respectively. Given our juridical system,
Type II is clearly a graver error than Type I, so we might
accept 
 
higher than we can accept 

.
An   code is said to be combinatorially  -secure if
it has a tracing algorithm which succeeds with probability 1
when there are at most   pirates. It is said to be  -secure with
-error if the probability of error (of either type) is at most 
when there are at most   pirates.
Our challenge is to find codes with the best possible
parameters. The number of users  and the the threshold
  should be as large as possible. The length  and the error
probability  should be as small as possible. Evidently, these
are conflicting goals. Typically, we will fix  ,  , and  and
do our best to minimise .
III. CODE AND DECODING
The Boneh-Shaw code is a concatenated code. The inner
code will be called BS-RS (Boneh-Shaw replication scheme);
it is a binary   
 code which is   -secure. The
code book has  
  distinct columns replicated  times. A
set of identical columns will be called a type. Every column
has the form         , such that the -th (     )
user has zeroes in the first 
  types and a one in the rest.
Theorem 1 (Boneh and Shaw) The BS-RS with replica-
tion factor  is  -secure with -error whenever  
	

 	.
A hybrid fingerprint is characterised by the number 

of
ones for each column type . Let 

  and 
 
  by
convention (as if there were a column type 0 with all zeroes,
and a type  with all ones). The 

are stochastic variables
with distributions depending on the pirate strategy. If user 
be innocent, the pirates cannot distinguish between column
types  and 
 , and consequently 

 
  
. The decoding
algorithm of Boneh-Shaw scheme used a hard decision. If




  
 was sufficiently large, then user  was assumed to
be guilty.
Our idea is to return soft information. The output is a vector
   
 
     
 
, given as






 
  

 (1)
Observe that all the 

sum to 1 and 

 

  for all .
Furthermore, if the pirates cannot see symbol , then  

 
.
The alert reader may think that the definition 

is a strange
choice, and indeed it is. Soft-decision decoding is based on the
idea that the larger 

is, the more likely it is that  is correct
decoding. However, when  is incorrect, 

is expected to be
close to zero, and both high and low values of 

indicates
that  is likely to be correct. The advantage of the present
definition is that the distribution is nice and easy to work with
in the error analysis. We tried to use the absolute value of


instead, but then the analysis became too complicated to
complete. Our definition might not be optimal, but it does
work well.
As outer codes, Boneh and Shaw suggested random -
ary code which would be decoded using closest neighbour
decoding. We will study two schemes: Boneh-Shaw inner
codes with random outer codes, and Boneh-Shaw inner codes
with outer codes with large distance (Algebraic Geometry
or Reed-Solomon codes). Both schemes use soft-decision list
decoding as described below.
After inner decoding of all the blocks, we form the   
reliability matrix   


 where the -th row is the vector
 from inner decoding of the -th block. The outer decoding
algorithm takes the    reliability matrix  as input and
returns all codewords    
 
     

 that satisfy
   

 
 


 
  (2)
It is important that the terms 

 
of the sum are stochastically
independent. Furthermore, 

 
is bounded in the interval


  and has a fairly simple distribution. This will allow us
to use the well-known Chernoff bound in the error analysis.
IV. ERROR ANALYSIS
In this section, we shall bound the error probability for
concatenated codes with Boneh-Shaw inner codes and soft
decision decoding as defined in the previous section. The
principle of the analysis follows [5], and the results are phrased
in terms of the relative entropy defined as follows:
    


  
  

 

 
 (3)
Theorem 2 (Probability of failure) Using the concatenated
code with a BS-RS inner code and soft input list decoding
with threshold     for the outer code, the probability of
failing to accuse any guilty user is given as


 	
 	
 where   

 
	




  
	 

 (4)
This bound is independent of the choice of outer code.
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Proof: The probability 

that the decoding algorithm
outputs no guilty user, is bounded as


 



 

 
 
 
 



 
 

 



 
 


 


where



 
 



 
 


 
 
 



 

 

 
  


Obviously
 




 
  

 
and  


 
  
   when  is not seen by the pirates.
Hence we get  

   . Observe that 
  

 . In
order to get a stochastic variable in the range 
 , we set


    

	. Thus
 

   
  
	 

and we get


 



 
 



 
	



If    , the Chernoff bound is applicable, proving the
theorem.
Theorem 3 (False accusations for random codes)
Concatenating a    
   BS-RS code with a random
outer code using soft input list decoding with threshold
   for the outer code, the probability of accusing an
innocent user is


 	


   		
 where   

 
	




  
	

 (5)
Proof: Let  	 
 be an innocent user. The probability
of accusing  is
    



 
 


 
 


Clearly  

 
  . Like in the last section, we make a
stochastic variable in the 
  range,



 

 
	

 

 
  
	

and
    



 
 



 
	



Multiplying by the number of innocent users gives the theo-
rem.
Theorem 4 (Asymptotic codes) For any    , there is an
asymptotic class of    -secure codes with    and rate
given by






 


 
 
 

 
 

using Boneh-Shaw inner codes and random outer codes.
Proof: For asymptotic codes, 

  if    , so we
can take    . Likewise, II   if    and






 


 
 
 

 

Since 

    
 , we get the theorem.
Theorem 5 (False accusations for AG codes)
Concatenating a   
  BS-RS code with a   	 Æ
outer code using soft input list decoding with threshold  for
the outer code, the probability of accusing an innocent user
is


 	


       Æ	 		
 (6)
where
 

	


   
 Æ
	 
   
 Æ
 (7)
provided     
 Æ.
Proof: We bound the probability    of accusing 
when  is innocent, i.e.
    



 
 


 
 


An innocent user  can match a given pirate in at most  
Æ
positions. Thus there are at most   
 Æ positions where 
matches some pirate. For the purpose of a worst case analysis,
we assume that 

 
  whenever 

matches a pirate. There
are at least !  
 
    
 Æ positions 
 
     

, where


 

is given by (1) with 

 
  
. Thus we get
    


	

 
 




 

 "!




!  

   
 Æ
" 

   
 Æ

   
 Æ

Clearly, " increases in Æ as well as in .
When 

 
  
, we have  


 
  
  . Setting


    



 

	, we get  

  	 and
    


	

 
 



  "
	
!




The result follows.
Authorized licensed use limited to: University of Surrey. Downloaded on November 24, 2008 at 09:15 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
Hard dec. [5] Random codes Reed-Solomon
      
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   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	 		
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF FINITE CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE TWO NEW SCHEMES
AND THE ORIGINAL BONEH-SHAW CODE WITH IMPROVED ERROR
ANALYSIS. THE ERROR RATE IS     .
Theorem 6 (Asymptotic codes) For any    , there is an
asymptotic class Boneh-Shaw codes with AG outer codes
which are    -secure with   and rate given by





 
 
 
 (8)
where 

solves




  




 

   

 


  #
	





	

 (9)
# 

  





 

   

 
  





 

   

  (10)
Proof: For asymptotic codes, 

  if    , so we
can take    . Likewise, 

  if both      
 Æ
and




   
 Æ
 
 	
Using AG codes with
  
 Æ 



 
 

where  is an even prime power, we can get codes with 

solving (9). The inner rate is    
 , thus giving the
theorem.
The number of pirates  , is a property of the resulting codes,
whereas  is a control parameter chosen so as to maximise


. We have computed some asymptotic rates in Table II, by
choosing  by trial and error, and solving (9) by fix point
iteration.
Interestingly, both the bounds on 

and 

are independent
of , and hence we are going to choose    to minimise
the length. In Table I, we compare lengths for the different
variants. A similar comparison of asymptotic rates appears in
Table II.
V. ON COMPLEXITY, CONCLUSIONS, OPEN PROBLEMS
The contribution of these paper is to show how the Boneh-
Shaw fingerprinting scheme can be significantly improved by
passing soft information from the inner to the outer decoder.
Random codes AG codes Old record
  Rate  Rate Rate
2  	 
 
     0.0688 [5]
3 	  
      0.000638 [1]
4  	      
5  
 
 	
    
TABLE II
ASYMPTOTIC RATES FOR SOME CONSTRUCTIONS WITH BONEH-SHAW
INNER CODE AND SOFT DECISSION DECODING.
The only existing scheme with comparable or better informa-
tion rate is the Tardos scheme, which may unfortunately be
subject to adverse selection (see [5]).
The decoding complexity is $   using random
codes and linear search. This complexity is typical for
collusion-secure codes, and the Tardos scheme also has this
complexity. The only known schemes with better complexity
are those using Guruswami-Sudan (GS) decoding for the outer
code, such as [1]. Using outer codes with large distance,
we may be able to get complexity $ , by Kötter-
Vardy (KV) decoding [4], which is a soft-input variant of GS
decoding. However, some adaptions will be required to make
our codes work with KV decoding.
The best known lower bound on the length is  
  

  [6], this bound is also reached by the Tardos
scheme [6] with a slight relaxation of the security definition.
Our scheme with random codes has        , and with
AG codes it becomes        , so improvements may
be possible.
Another important open question is to adapt the scheme
for KV decoding, which requires non-negative entries in the
reliability matrix and a certain form for the threshold (linear
in 

). If the reliability matrix and the threshold can
be adapted to be compatible with KV decoding, we would
get a fingerprinting scheme with the best known decoding
complexity and the best known information rate for this
complexity.
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